Du musst schon die komplette Historie betrachten.
Aufgrund des falschen Ansatz gegensätzliche Anforderungen in ein Baukasten-Fluggerät zu vereinen ist das Projekt F-35 finanziell und zeitlich am Arsch.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockhe...5_Lightning_II
Zitat:
The F-35 program has experienced a number of cost overruns and developmental delays. The program's delays have come under fire from the U.S. Congress and some U.S. Department of Defense officials. The program has undergone a number of reassessments and changes since 2006. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) warned in March 2006 that excessive concurrency might result in expensive refits for several hundred F-35 aircraft that are planned for production before design testing is completed.[42] In 2010, acquisition chief Ashton Carter issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum restructuring the F-35 program.[43] In November 2010, the GAO found that "Managing an extensive, still-maturing global network of suppliers adds another layer of complexity to producing aircraft efficiently and on-time" and that "due to the extensive amount of testing still to be completed, the program could be required to make alterations to its production processes, changes to its supplier base, and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft, if problems are discovered."[44] USAF budget data in 2010, along with other sources, projected the F-35 to have a flyaway cost from US$89 million to US$200 million over the planned production run.[45][46] In February 2011, the Pentagon put a price of $207.6 million on each of the 32 aircraft to be acquired in FY2012, rising to $304.16 million ($9,732.8 million ÷ 32 aircraft) if its share of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) spending is included.[47][48]
Den A-10 direkt zu ersetzen war NIE Ziel des JSF-Programms sondern eine FOLGE der Probleme mit dem JSF-Programms.
Zitat:
The JSF program was designed to replace the United States military F-16, A-10, F/A-18 (excluding newer E/F "Super Hornet" variants) and AV-8B tactical fighter and attack aircraft.
Man versucht einfach Geld freizuschaufeln.
Die USAF versucht einfach den Bedarf für den A-10 in Abrede zu stellen indem sie gleichwertigen Ersatz suggerieren.
Dies wird von vielen aktiven Kommandeuren mit Einsatzerfahrungen in Abrede gestellt, man möchte einen Schlachtflieger, einen verbesserten A-10.
Die Argumente der USAF sind erst mal einleuchtend:
Zitat:
The Air Force plans to use the F-35A to primarily take up the close air support (CAS) mission in contested environments. Amid criticism that the aircraft is not well suited for the role compared to a dedicated attack platform, Air Force chief of staff Mark Welsh is putting focus on weapons for the F-35 to employ on CAS sorties including guided rockets, fragmentation rockets that would shatter into individual projectiles before impact, and lighter, smaller ammunition in higher capacity gun pods.[292] Fragmentary rocket warheads would have greater effects than cannon shells fired from a gun because a single rocket would create a "thousand-round burst," delivering more projectiles than a strafing run could. Other weapons could take advantage of the aircraft's helmet-mounted cueing system to aim rather than needing to point the nose at a target.[293]
...nur kann die F-35 nicht so gut manövrieren wie eine A-10, sollte nicht so dicht rangehen wie eine A-10 weil die Pelle dünner ist und mit vielen Waffen in den Außenpunkten der Stelth-Vorteil dahin ist.
Und nix von den dafür notwendigen Hightech-Target-Aquisition&Tracking Zeugs funktioniert auch nur im Ansatz.
Eine Armee braucht keinen Flug-PC den man während eines Angriffs 3x booten muss sondern etwas Rohes was immer funktioniert.
Zitat:
A 2014 Pentagon report found these issues:
First two mission data sets available November 2015, after USMC IOC.
Overall operational suitability relies heavily on contractor support and unacceptable workarounds.
Aircraft availability reached 51% but short of 60% goal.
Fuel Tanks don't retain inerting for required 12 hours after landing.
High dynamic loads on the rudder at lower altitudes in 20-26 AoA preventing testing.
82 pounds added to F-35B in last 38 months, 337 pounds below limit.
Transonic Roll-Off (TRO) and airframe buffet continue to be program concerns.
572 deficiencies remain affecting Block 2B capability, 151 of which are critical.
VSim would likely not support planned Block 2B operational testing in 2015.
Maintainability hours still an issue.
ALIS requires many manual workarounds.[149]
A 2015 Pentagon report found these issues:[190]
The Joint Program Office is re-categorizing or failing to count aircraft failures to try to boost maintainability and reliability statistics;
Testing is continuing to reveal the need for more tests, but the majority of the fixes and for capability deficiencies being discovered are being deferred to later blocks rather than being resolved;
The F-35 has a significant risk of fire due to extensive fuel tank vulnerability, lightning vulnerability and an OBIGGS system unable to sufficiently reduce fire-sustaining oxygen, despite redesigns;
Wing drop concerns are still not resolved after six years, and may only be mitigated or solved at the expense of combat maneuverability and stealth;
The June engine problems are seriously impeding or preventing the completion of key test points, including ensuring that the F-35B delivered to the Marine Corps for IOC meets critical safety requirements; no redesign, schedule, or cost estimate for a long-term fix has been defined yet, thereby further impeding g testing;
Even in its third iteration, the F-35’s helmet continues to show high false-alarm rates and computer stability concerns, seriously reducing pilots’ situational awareness and endangering their lives in combat;
The number of Block 2B’s already limited combat capabilities being deferred to later blocks means that the Marine Corps’ FY2015 IOC squadron will be even less combat capable than originally planned;
ALIS software failures continue to impede operation, mission planning, and maintenance of the F-35, forcing the Services to be overly reliant on contractors and “unacceptable workarounds”;
Deficiencies in Block 2B software, and deferring those capabilities to later blocks, is undermining combat suitability for all three variants of the F-35;
The program’s attempts to save money now by reducing test points and deferring crucial combat capabilities will result in costly retrofits and fixes later down the line, creating a future unaffordable bow wave that, based on F-22 experience, will add at least an additional $67 billion in acquisition costs; and
Low availability and reliability of the F-35 is driven by inherent design problems that are only becoming more obvious and difficult to fix.